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1. INTRODUCTION
If people are risk averse, then it is efficient for those people to elimi-
nate idiosyncratic risk by sharing it with others. Numerous authors1 have
tested the hypothesis that risk is shared efficiently across households by ask-
ing whether idiosyncratic variation in household expenditures is correlated
with idiosyncratic variation in income. Typically the hypothesis is rejected,
with possible explanations for the rejection having to do with problems of
commitment or private information.
We offer another test of full risk sharing, but rather than testing risk-
sharing across households, we test risk-sharing among individuals within a
household. Within a household it seems likely the problems of commitment
and private information will be small. The longevity of relationships within
a household and frequent interaction and exchange of information would all
tend to lead to an efficient sharing of risk.
As an empirical matter, these tests of efficient risk-sharing, whether across
households or within them, all require panel data; the restrictions that are
being tested are essentially inter-temporal restrictions implied by a dynamic
model.
Full intra-household efficiency implies both productive efficiency, as well
as allocational efficiency. Other authors who have conducted tests of intra-
household efficiency have tested only one or another of these. Udry (1996),
for example, focuses on productive efficiency, while a much larger num-
ber of authors have focused on allocational efficiency (e.g., Thomas, 1990;
Lundberg et al., 1997; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Bobonis, 2009).
One important difficulty (which the previous authors each address in dis-
tinct ingenious but indirect ways) involved in testing intra-household alloca-
tional efficiency is that intra-household allocations are seldom observed—
ordinarily the best an econometrician can hope for is carefully recorded
panel data with household-level consumption expenditures.
In this paper we exploit a carefully collected dataset which records food
consumption for each individual within a household over four successive
periods, and test allocational efficiency of different goods across dates and
states. By allocational efficiency we mean, in effect, that the marginal
rate of substitution between any two state contingent commodities will be
equated across household members.
To go with our panel dataset, we construct a dynamic model. The ad-
vantages of using a dynamic model to test the efficiency of intra-household
allocations come from the fact that in an efficient allocation two different
1Notable examples include Mace (1991); Townsend (1994); Udry (1994); Jalan and
Ravallion (1999); Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009); Mazzocco and Saini (2011).
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kinds of conditions must be satisfied. First, goods such as leisure and con-
sumption or apples and oranges be allocated efficiently across individuals
within a period, equating different individual’s marginal rates of substitu-
tion across these goods. This sort of static allocational efficiency forms
the basis of tests of intra-household efficiency that are associated with the
“collective” household model of Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992). These
models are often interpreted in such a way as to allow changes in allocations
over time in response to changes in ‘distribution factors’ or utility weights.
But second, dynamic efficiency actually requires that these utility weights
remain constant over time, and implies that individuals’ marginal rates of
substitution will be equated not just within a period, but also across peri-
ods. And this is exactly the implication exploited in the literature that tests
risk-sharing across households.
Accordingly, we follow the Arrow-Debreu convention of indexing com-
modities not only by their physical characteristics, but also by the date and
state in which the commodity is delivered. Thus, to restate, dynamic alloca-
tional efficiency implies not only that people within a household consume
apples and oranges in the correct proportion, but also that within the house-
hold there is full insurance.
Without pretending any sort of exhaustive comparison of our paper with
existing literature, we will mention that Dercon and Krishnan (2000) also
construct a test of intra-household risk-sharing using data from Ethiopia,
with a model which is also dynamic by looking at the response of in-
dividual nutritional status to illness shocks. However, because they lack
individual-level data on consumption or nutrition, they’re forced to assume
that utility depends on food consumption only via anthropometric status.
So, for example, children are implicitly assumed to be indifferent between
consuming a varied diet with fruit, meat, and vegetables and a subsistence
diet of beans, provided that either diet results in similar weight-for-height
outcomes. With this assumption, Dercon and Krishnan reject full intra-
household risk-sharing (at least for poorer households) but their results
could also be consistent with efficient intra-household risk-sharing if people
derive utility not only from nutrition but also directly from food consump-
tion. Our data allow us to distinguish between these possibilities. We allow
individual utility functions to depend on consumption both directly and via
the influence of consumption on nutritional outcomes.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we provide an extended description
of the data. We describe some patterns observed in the sharing rules of
Philippino households, including expected levels of consumption, and both
individual and household-level measures of risk in both consumption and
income.
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Second, in Section 3 we formulate a simple dynamic model in which
utility depends on consumption, but productivity does not. An altruistic
head allocates consumption goods and assigns activities to other household
members. From this model we derive a simple restriction on household
members’ marginal rates of substitution. Working with a parametric rep-
resentation of individuals’ utility functions, we estimate a vector of prefer-
ence parameters, which allows us to characterize changes in intrahousehold
sharing rules as a function of individual characteristics such as age and sex.
In Section 4, we consider the possibility that food consumption influences
future productivity. In particular, food consumption is assumed to produce
both direct utility and also to be a human capital investment which influ-
ences labor productivity. This leads us to consider a model of nutritional
investments, which reproduces some of the features of models formulated
by, e.g., Pitt et al. (1990); Pitt and Rosenzweig (1985). In this model the
head takes into account the effect that consumption will have on both utility
and productivity. This model also implies a set of restrictions on household
members’ marginal rates of substitution which distinguish it from the first
model.
Section 5 presents our main results maintaining the hypothesis of full
risk-sharing, we estimate a collection of preference parameters. We per-
mit heterogeneous risk preferences within the household, along the lines
of Mazzocco (2007), and take the senior female in the household to be the
household head.2 A key result involves estimates of the ratio of relative risk
aversions of the female head to the relative risk aversion of (i) males in the
household; and (ii) other females in the household. Our estimates of these
ratios indicate that risk aversion doesn’t vary greatly across females, but that
female risk aversion is roughly fifty per cent greater than the risk aversion
of males. We also estimate how the ages of individual household members
affects the rate of growth of nutritional intakes, and find particularly large
effects for boys. We find evidence that sickness and pregnancy both have a
negative effect on nutritional intakes for women. Taken together, these esti-
mates of the effects of individual characteristics could be used to construct
much richer models of household-level nutritional demand than currently
prevail in the literature.
The version of the household model we estimate usefully accounts for
much of the variation we observe in consumption growth rates within the
2It’s more usual in the economics literature to imagine that adult males play the role of
household head. Our assumption that females are responsible for the kinds of allocational
decisions we model in this paper is motivated by our reading of the literature in anthropol-
ogy and sociology which describes the division of household responsibilities in the rural
Philippines (e.g., Illo, 1995; Eder, 2006).
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household, but relies on the hypothesis that allocations within the house-
hold are efficient, both within and across different date-states. The hypoth-
esis of efficiency across different date-states amounts to assuming that there
is full risk sharing within the household. We test this hypothesis using an
approach similar in spirit to the inter-household tests of full risk sharing
devised by Townsend (1994), and ask whether unexpected changes in indi-
vidual earnings have any effect on the allocation of consumption, and reject
the hypothesis of full risk-sharing. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE DATA
The main data used in this paper are drawn from a survey conducted
by the International Food Policy Research Institute and the Research Insti-
tute for Mindanao Culture in the Southern region of the Bukidnon Province
of Mindanao Island in the Philippines during 1984–1985. These data are
described in greater detail by Bouis and Haddad (1990) and in the refer-
ences contained therein. Additional data on weather used in this paper were
collected by the first author from the weather station of Malay-Balay in
Bukidnon.
Bukidnon is a poor rural and mainly agricultural area of the Philippines.
Early in 1984, a random sample of 2039 households was drawn from 18
villages in the area of interest. A preliminary survey was administered to
each household to elicit information used to develop criteria for a stratified
random sample later selected for more detailed study. The preliminary sur-
vey indicated that farms larger than 15 hectares amounted to less than 3 per
cent of all households, a figure corresponding closely to the 1980 agricul-
tural census. Only households farming less than 15 hectares and having at
least one child under five years old were eligible for selection. Based on
this preliminary survey, a stratified random sample of 510 households from
ten villages was chosen. Some attrition (mostly because of outmigration)
occurred during the study and a total of 448 households from ten villages
finally participated in the four surveys conducted at four month intervals
beginning in July 1984 and ending in August 1985. The total number of
persons in the survey is 3294.
The nutritional component of the survey interviewed respondents to elicit
a 24-hour recall of individual food intakes, as well as one month and four
month interviews to measure household level food and non-food expendi-
tures. Though measurement error seems likely to be an important issue with
these 24-hour recall data, the fact that we have independently collected data
on household-level expenditures means that we have an instrument with
which to address this issue. This exceptional richness of the data constitute
a powerful source of identification in our empirical analysis. Food intakes
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include quantity information for a highly disaggregated set of food items.
Individual food expenditures can be computed using direct information on
the prices of foods purchased, and on quantities consumed by the individ-
ual. The survey is also designed to measure food consumed outside of the
household (so that there is no “flypaper” effect as in Jacoby (2002)).
Later in the paper we will concern ourselves with changes in individu-
als’ consumption, intentionally neglecting to explain differences in levels
of consumption, as these may depend on individuals’ unobservable charac-
teristics. However, some of these differences are interesting, and so some
information on levels of individual expenditures along with caloric and pro-
tein intakes are given in Table 1. Turning to the final columns of the table,
we first note that the average individual in our sample is not terribly well-
fed. Comparing the figures in Table 1 to standard guidelines for energy-
protein requirements (WHO, 1985) reveals that even the average person in
our sample faces something of an energy deficit.
When we consider the average consumption of different age-sex groups,
it becomes clear that particular groups are particularly malnourished. Also,
these figures show clearly that the relationship between consumptions and
age follows consistently an inverse U shaped pattern which is quite reassur-
ing about the reliability of these measures.
The picture of inequality drawn by our attention to energy and protein
intakes is, if anything, exacerbated by closer attention to the sources of nu-
trition. While all of the foods considered here are sources of calories and
protein, it also seems likely that food consumption is valued not just for its
nutritive content, but that individuals also derive some direct utility from
certain kinds of consumption. This point receives some striking support
from Table 1. Consider, for example, average daily expenditures by males
aged 26–50, compared with the same category of expenditures by women of
the same age. The value of expenditures on male consumption of all staples
is 28 per cent greater than that of females of the same age. This differ-
ence seems small enough that it could easily be attributed to differences in
activity or metabolic rate. However, compare expenditures on what are pre-
sumably superior goods: expenditures on male consumption of meat (and
fish), vegetables, snacks (including fruit) is 424 per cent greater than the
corresponding expenditures by women in the same age group. Since noth-
ing like a difference of this size shows up in calories or protein, this seems
like very strong evidence that intra-household allocation mechanisms are
designed to put a particularly high weight on the utility of prime-age males
relative to other household members, quite independent of those prime-age
males’ greater energy-protein requirements. Note that although these dif-
ferences in consumption seem to point to an inegalitarian allocation, these
NUTRITION & RISK SHARING WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 7
differences provide no evidence to suggest that household allocations are
inefficient.
3. FULL RISK SHARING WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD
Consider a household having n members, indexed by i= 1,2, . . .n, where
an index of 1 is understood to refer to the household head. Time is indexed
by t = 0,1, . . .T , where T may be infinite. During each period, member i
consumes a K-vector of goods cit = (c1it , ...,c
K
it ). At the same time, i under-
takes m additional activities ait , which may include leisure and labor (e.g.,
plowing a field, watching a child, or cleaning the stables).
Household member i derives direct utility from consumption and activ-
ities. Further, at time t person i possesses a set of characteristics (e.g.,
gender, weight, age) which we denote by the vector bit . These charac-
teristics may have an influence on the utility she derives from both con-
sumption and activities. Thus, we write her momentary utility at t as some
U(cit ,bit)+Zi(ait ,bit), where the function U is assumed to be increasing,
concave, and continuously differentiable in each of the consumption goods.
The function Zi captures the (dis)utility associated with activities, but is al-
lowed to depend on both ait and on bit . In this way we capture the idea that
the same tasks may involve different costs for people with different charac-
teristics: for example, if ait is the activity of plowing a field, it’s reasonable
to think that the disutility of that task will be greater for a young child than
for a stronger adult male.
Of course, labor activities are useful for production, in particular agricul-
tural production. Let y be a vector of goods (eg., corn, sugarcane, household
services). In general, there will be uncertainty in production; and y is a ran-
dom variable whose joint p.d.f will depend on a and on other observable
factors w (such as weather).
Following Becker (1974), we imagine that the altruistic household head
is responsible for allocating consumption and assigning activities within the
household; however, we regard this simply as a device for characterizing the
set of Pareto optimal allocations. As argued by Chiappori (1988, 1992), in
a static model the restriction of efficiency tells us nothing about the levels
of consumption we expect to observe in the household (in our setting, the
hypothesis of efficiency tells us nothing about the altruism of the head).
However, in a dynamic setting, the hypothesis of Pareto optimality puts very
strong restrictions on the evolution of these shares, and it is these restrictions
which we exploit in this paper.
In any event, we associate a Pareto weight with the utility of each house-
hold member (with the normalization that the weight for the head is equal
to one). The weight for the ith household member can be interpreted as
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reflecting the altruism of the household head toward i. In particular, let the
altruism weight associated with member i’s utility be given by αi ∈ (0,1],3
and let α1 (the head’s weight) be normalized to one.
We formulate the problem facing the head (or social planner) recursively.
At the beginning of a period, given a list of the characteristics of household
members (b); prices (p); the total of household expenditures for the period
x; and a collection of exogenous observables w, she then chooses consump-
tions and allocations subject to the constraints implied by these prices and
resources. Let H(p,x,b,w) denote the discounted, expected utility of the
head given the current state, and let this function satisfy
H(p,x,b,w) = max
{(ci,ai)}ni=1
n
∑
i=1
αi (U(ci,bi)+Zi(ai,bi))
+β
∫
H
(
pˆ, pˆ′
n
∑
i=1
yi, bˆ, wˆ
)
dG(pˆ,y1, . . . ,yn, bˆ, wˆ|p,a1, . . . ,an,w)
subject to the household budget constraint
(1) p′
n
∑
i=1
ci ≤ x.
Here variables with ‘hats’ denote future realizations of the variable, and
the distribution function G denotes the joint distribution of next period’s
prices and output for each of the n household members given this period’s
activities, prices, and other observables w.
It’s very important to notice that in the present model consumption as-
signments yield utility, but do not affect future characteristics b. For some
sorts of physical characteristics (e.g., weight) this is obviously unrealistic,
and in Section 4 we relax this assumption. One of our aims is to test whether
or not consumption is allocated so as to take into account the benefits of
“nutritional investment;” if so, this is a factor influencing intra-household
allocation which is inappropriately neglected here.
Without nutritional investment, the first order conditions from this prob-
lem imply that
Uk(c1t ,b1t)
Uk(cit ,bit)
= αi
k = 1, . . . ,K, and i = 1, . . . ,n, where Uk(c,b) denotes the marginal utility
of the kth consumption good. From this, it’s easy to see that consumption
3The literature on intrahousehold allocation sometimes treats these weights as functions
of endowments or other ‘distribution factors.’ But, as Bourguignon et al. (2009) point out,
this won’t do in a dynamic model with efficient allocations. In our setting, changes in the
weights would be inefficient.
NUTRITION & RISK SHARING WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 9
is allocated so that members’ marginal rates of substitution are all equated.
This implies full risk sharing, as that
(2)
Uk(c1t+1,b1t+1)
Uk(c1t ,b1t)
=
Uk(cit+1,bit+1)
Uk(cit ,bit)
This implies that the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the head
and any other household member will be equated at every period, and in
every state.
A solution to the sharing problem facing the household head is a set
of functions which indicate the expenditures assigned to each household
member i, xi = e˜i(x, p,b), i = 1, . . . ,n, and individual demand functions
ci= c(xi, p,bi). We can use these demands to define indirect period-specific
utilities from consumption,
v(xi, p,bi)≡U(c(xi, p,bi),bi).
It’s also convenient to define a corresponding individual expenditure func-
tion mapping momentary utility w from consumption for an individual (given
prices and characteristics) into expenditures on consumption for i, so that
xi = e(w, p,bi), satisfies
xi ≡ e(v(xi, p,bi), p,bi),
so that e is the inverse of the indirect utility function v.
Substituting the indirect utility function v into the head’s problem yields
H(p,x,b,w) = max
{a1,(xi,ai)ni=2}
v
(
x−
n
∑
i=2
xi, p,b1
)
+Z1(a1,b1)
+
n
∑
i=2
αi(v(xi, p,bi)+Zi(ai,bi))
+β
∫
H
(
pˆ, pˆ′
n
∑
i=1
yi, bˆ, wˆ
)
dG(pˆ,y1, . . . ,yn, bˆ, wˆ|p,a1, . . . ,an,w).
Let the notation v′(x, p,b) denote the partial derivative of v with respect to
expenditures x. First order conditions for this reformulation of the problem
imply that v′(x1t , pt ,b1t)/v′(xit , pt ,bit) = αi for i= 1, . . . ,n and t = 1, . . . ,T .
As a consequence,
(3)
v′(x1t+1, pt+1,b1t+1)
v′(x1t , pt ,b1t f )
=
v′(xit+1, pt+1,bit+1)
v′(xit , pt ,bit)
.
Note the similarity of restrictions on consumptions (2) to restrictions on
indirect utilities (3); we will exploit this similarity to use both expenditures
and quantities of goods consumed in our empirical work.
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To conduct estimation and inference, we need to specify at least some
components of agents’ preferences over food consumption. At the same
time, because children’s and adults’ food preferences may be quite differ-
ent, we want to permit a great deal of heterogeneity in preferences over
different consumption goods. Accordingly, following Dubois (2000) we
partition the vector of personal characteristics bit into three distinct parts.
Let υi denote time invariant characteristics of person i (such as sex), and
let ζit denote time-varying characteristics of the same person (such as age
and health). Both υi and ζit are assumed to be observed by the econometri-
cian. In contrast, let ξit denote unobserved, time-varying characteristics or
preference shocks of person i at time t.
Recalling that consumption consists of K elements (c1, ...,cK), we pa-
rameterize the utility of person i from food consumption at date t by
(4) U (cit ,bit) =
K
∑
k=1
exp
(
υ′iγk+ζ
′
itδk+ξit
)
AkiB
k
t
(ckit)
1−θ′kυi
1−θ′kυi
.
Here (γ,δ,θ1, ...,θK) are each vectors of unknown parameters. Thus, the
factor exp(υ′iγ+ζ′itδ+ξit) allows the utility (and marginal utility) of all con-
sumption to vary according to both observed and unobserved characteristics
(as in, e.g., Blundell et al., 1994). Note in particular that one can model
differences in the utility derived from consuming foodstuffs according to
features such as age and sex. The (possibly unobserved) factors {Aki }Kk=1
govern the relative, idiosyncratic utility a given person derives from differ-
ent consumption goods: think of invariant differences in preferences over
vegetables and sweets, for example. In contrast, the factors {Bkt } govern
time-varying differences in preferences over different commodities; think
of seasonal differences in preferences for starchy foods. Finally, the lin-
ear functions θ′kυi can be regarded as the relative risk aversion person i has
over variation in the consumption of good k, so that risk attitudes can vary
according to sex, ethnicity, or other time-invariant characteristics. Given
our previous remarks, an almost identical parameterization will serve for
modeling the indirect utility of expenditures.
With the specification of preferences given above, the intertemporal mar-
ginal rate of substitution of consumption of the household head 1 is equal
to the same marginal rate of substitution for person i, and can be written as
(5)
exp(∆ζ′1t+1δk+∆ξ1t+1)
(
xk1t+1
xk1t
)−θ′kυ1
= exp(∆ζ′it+1δk+∆ξit+1)
(
xkit+1
xkit
)−θ′kυi
where ∆ is the first difference operator. Notice that this is true for the head
and any other household member i.
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Our preference specification (4) is a straightforward generalization of
the commonly used Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences;
however, it differs importantly because these preferences yield demand sys-
tems which are (Gorman) aggregable over neither different goods nor differ-
ent people. Where the usual CES preferences involve a constant elasticity
of substitution between goods, either for a single person or across different
household members, this specification is flexible enough to allow variable
elasticities of substitution. Where CES preferences would imply that fixed
expenditure shares of consumption would be allocated to different people
and to different goods, the additional flexibility of allowing different cur-
vature parameters means that efficient allocation will not generally give
household members fixed consumption expenditures, as in the CES case;
rather expenditure shares will vary with total household expenditures and
with changes in the time-varying characteristics of household members.
4. NUTRITIONAL INVESTMENT
We now extend the model of Section 3 to take into account the possibil-
ity that current consumption provides some sort of nutrition to household
members, which in turn may affect the future (dis)utility associated with
some particular activities. This new model is somewhat in the spirit of, say,
Stiglitz (1976), or Dasgupta and Ray (1986). We have reason to believe that
models in which nutrition may affect productivity are particularly salient,
because using the same data (but looking across households, rather than
within them) Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) find evidence that predictable
variation in the returns to nutritional investment is correlated with caloric
intake (for them, variation in returns comes from variation in the form of
the labor contract).
Notation is as in Section 3. Recall that at date t, member i is described
by some set of physical characteristics bit , which may include things like
gender, height, weight, health, and so on. Earlier, bit evolved according to
some unspecified stochastic process, but this evolution was assumed no to
depend on current activities and consumption.
Now the physical characteristics of household members are assumed to
evolve in response to consumption according to a law of motion M, so that
bit+1 =M(bit ,cit).
Note that this law of motion permits consumption at time t to influence sub-
sequent characteristics. Though this law of motion is a first-order Markov
process, one could allow more complicated temporal dependence through
clever specification of the vector bit , permitting it, for example, to include
lagged variables.
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As before, let y be a vector of goods (e.g., corn, sugar, household ser-
vices). In general, there will be uncertainty in production; we regard y as
a random variable with joint p.d.f. f (y|a,w). Note the implicit restriction:
the probability of corn yields being high depends on the field being properly
plowed, but it doesn’t depend on the physical characteristics of the person
who actually performed the plowing, even though that person’s disutility
from plowing may depend on those characteristics. Also note that the dis-
tribution of y depends not only on activities a, but also on observables w.
Formally, this is due to the fact that y does not depend directly on b but
Zi does. The new problem facing the household head requires her to take
into account the influence of current consumption on future productivity:
(6) H(p,x,b1, . . . ,bn,w) = max{(ci,ai)}ni=1
n
∑
i=1
αi (U(ci,bi)+Zi(ai,bi))
+β
∫
H
(
pˆ, pˆ′
n
∑
i=1
yi, bˆ1, . . . , bˆn, wˆ
)
dG(pˆ,y1, . . . ,ynwˆ|p,a1, . . . ,an,w)
subject to the budget constraint
(7) p′
n
∑
i=1
ci ≤ x
and the law of motion for physical characteristics
(8) bˆi =M(bi,ci).
The distribution function G denotes the joint distribution of next period’s
prices and output for each of the n household members given this period’s
activities and prices. The value pˆ′∑ni=1 yi represents the next period budget
of the household. Note that G no longer governs the evolution of bi; rather,
this evolution proceeds according to (8).
Now consumption can affect not only utility but also future productivity.
This changes the allocation problem facing the household head. Let JckM
denote the column of the Jacobian matrix of M corresponding to the partial
derivatives of future characteristics with respect to consumption good k,
and let JbiH denote the row of the Jacobian matrix of the value function
H corresponding to the partial derivatives of H with respect to the vector
of characteristics for person i. Then when the head gives consumption cki
to person i, the marginal benefit is not just the marginal utility Uk(ci,bi)
that appeared in (2), but also the returns to the nutritional investment: the
marginal effect of consumption of good k on characteristics of i times the
marginal returns to these characteristics.
Returns to nutritional investments are uncertain, so expected benefits are
what matter. Let Rki (p,x,b,w,a) denote the expected marginal benefit to an
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investment cik of good k in person i, given the current state (p,x,b,w) and
the activities (a1, . . . ,an) undertaken by the household. Differentiating the
second term of the Bellman equation (6) with respect to cik gives
Rki (p,x,b1, . . . ,bn,w,a1, . . . ,an)≡∫
JbiH(pˆ, pˆ
′
n
∑
j=1
yi,M(b1,c1), . . . ,M(bn,cn), wˆ)JckM(bi,ci)dG(pˆ,y1, . . . ,yn, wˆ|p,a1, . . . ,an,w).
Then first order conditions from the nutritional investment problem include
αiUk(ci,bi)+βRki (p,x,b,w,a) = µ,
for i= 1, . . . ,n and k = 1, . . . ,K, where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the budget constraint (7). Though this expression resembles the
conventional Euler equation which characterizes a consumer’s investment
decisions, it is not. In the conventional Euler equation the marginal ben-
efit of consuming today is equated with the marginal opportunity cost of
investing. Here both the terms on the left hand side are marginal benefits
associated with consumption; the opportunity cost is that the consumption
could have been given to some other person in the household, which is cap-
tured by the Lagrange multiplier µ.
Evaluating this expression at periods t and t+1 and for person i and for
the head, it follows that in the nutritional investment model the counterpart
to (2) is
(9)
αiUk(cit+1,bit+1)+βRkit+1
αiUk(cit ,bit)+βRkit
=
Uk(c1t+1,b1t+1)+βRk1t+1
Uk(c1t ,b1t)+βRk1t
.
In our earlier model, changes in the head’s marginal utility of consump-
tion were perfectly correlated with changes in person i’s marginal utility of
consumption, and it was this (along with a parameterization of the utility
function) that delivered the exclusion restrictions we used to test the ear-
lier model: after controlling for marginal utility “shifters” such as age and
health, earnings shouldn’t affect the relationship between the marginal util-
ities of people within the household.
In the nutritional investment model our earlier exclusion restriction doesn’t
hold: consumption given to person i will depend on expected returns to nu-
tritional investments, so that in this model we’d expect to observe a cor-
relation between idiosyncratic consumption and earnings. However, other
exclusion restrictions are implied by the model. Equation (9) implies that
the consumption of person i will be related to the consumption of the head
and the current values of the preference shifting characteristics bi and b1,
as before, but will also depend on the variables that influence expectations
of returns to nutritional investment, which are limited to contemporaneous
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values of (p,x,b,w,a) and their histories. In particular, current weather w
may help to predict future weather and thus future returns, so that differ-
ences in current weather conditions can be expected to influence current
consumption allocations. But after controlling for the predicted weather,
actual realizations of future weather should not influence current consump-
tion allocations, since the realizations simply aren’t known at the time of
the allocation.
5. EMPIRICAL TESTS
We’ve presented two models of intra-household allocation. Both of these
posit that allocations are dynamically efficient. In the first model consump-
tion influences only utility, and efficiency requires that within the household
the rate of change in marginal utility is equated across all household mem-
bers; thus, first model is a simple dynamic household model with efficient
allocation of food consumption exhibiting full risk sharing. In a model in
which all household members had identical CRRA utility functions, this
would imply that consumption growth rates would be identical within the
household. However, because we allow marginal utilities of consumption to
depend on time-varying individual characteristics and allow risk aversion to
depend on fixed individual characteristics it may be efficient for consump-
tion to change at different rates. For example, a more risk-averse individual
would happily exchange a higher expected consumption for a less variable
one. In this model observed differences in consumption growth rates are
attributed either to differences in risk aversion, or to changes in individual
characteristics which affect the marginal utility of food or nutrition.
The second model (nutritional investment) is one in which the allocation
of food affects not only the utility of different household members, but also
the production possibility set of the household. In this model, changes in the
allocation of energy and protein in the household may depend not only on
differences in the curvature of the utility function or on changes in individ-
ual characteristics such as age, but may also vary because the productivity
of particular household members may depend on the consumption assign-
ment in a way which varies over time. The most obvious example might
have to do with the additional energy required by some household members
during different seasons: household members who engage in heavy agri-
cultural labor may be assigned a disproportionate share of calories during
the harvest season, for example, or these same people may receive a greater
share of protein in advance of a period of hard labor.
NUTRITION & RISK SHARING WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 15
5.1. Estimating the Intra-household Risk Sharing Model. Equation (5)
gives a relationship between the growth rate of consumption and expendi-
tures for the household head and that of each household member if prefer-
ences are as assumed in (4) and if there’s efficient risk sharing. In this case,
consumption and expenditures depend on total household expenditures and
individual preferences and characteristics. We can use (5) to estimate the
relationship between the rate of changes of the head’s consumption and the
rate of change in others’ consumption. Taking logs of (5) and rearranging
yields the estimating equation
(10) ∆ log(xkit) = ∆ log(x
k
1t)
θ′kυ1
θ′kυi
+(∆ζit−∆ζ1t)′ δkθ′kυi
+
∆ξit−∆ξ1t
θ′kυi
.
This relates the rate of growth in i’s consumption of the kth consumption
good to the rate of growth in the head’s consumption, controlling for ob-
servable changes in characteristics such as (log) age and health (relative to
the head). Unobservable preference shocks or other changes in individual
characteristics (relative to the head) appear in the final term, and make up
the disturbance term in the estimating equation. Consequently, we adopt the
usual but important identifying assumption that unobserved time-varying
characteristics are mean independent of the observed characteristics (υi,ζit)
(i.e., that E(ξit |ζit ,υi) = E(ξit)).
It may be worth dwelling on the interpretation of (10). Note that there’s
no prediction regarding either the level of an individual’s consumption or
of his share, since both of these depend on the unobserved utility weights
{αi}. Rather, (10) characterizes only the rate of changes in expenditures and
consumption relative to the rate of change for the household head. Thus,
this equation does not help understanding inequality in the allocation of
household resources; only in understanding changes in the way in which
those resources are shared.
One feature of the environment which may help to explain rates of change
in consumption relative to the head has to do with heterogenous risk prefer-
ences: if household member i is more risk averse than the household head,
then changes in total household resources will produce smaller percentage
changes in i’s consumption than it will in the consumption of the head (and
conversely). Changes of this sort will be captured by our estimates of θk,
which enter the first term on the right-hand-side of equation (10). Alterna-
tively, changes in the relative needs of different household members may
result in changes in shares of food expenditures and nutrition relative to the
head. For example, as a small boy matures, one would expect his share of
household resources to increase, basically as a consequence of changes in
the utility the boy derives from food consumption. Changes of this sort are
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captured by changes in ζit , and for the kth good depend on the vector of
parameters δk.
Our attempts to estimate (10) are reported in Table 2. Here we exploit the
relationship between ratios of direct and indirect utility given by (2) and (3)
to estimate a system of three equations, each of the form of (10), but with
different measures of consumption.
Our first measure of consumption is individual food expenditures; our
second is individual caloric intake; and our third is total protein intake. For
time-varying individual characteristics ζit , we use a set of (per round) time
effects (and no constant term); interactions between sex and the logarithm
of age in years,4 and between sex and the number of days sick in the most
recent period; an indicator with the value of one if person i is in the sec-
ond or third trimester of pregnancy; and a measure of lactation (the number
of minutes spent nursing per day). For the fixed individual characteris-
tics υi governing relative risk aversion (θ′kυi), we’ve simply used gender.
This gives us a specification in which the sex of person i is interacted with
changes in the logarithm of the head’s consumption as the leading terms on
the right-hand side of the estimating equation. Since residuals from these
three different equations are a priori related, we’ve used a three-stage least
squares procedure to estimate this system of seemingly unrelated regres-
sions.
In the first stage, we use data on changes in log household-level food
expenditures (collected via a different survey instrument than our data on
individual-level consumption) to instrument for changes in the log of the
household heads’ food expenditures. Similarly, we use the entire basket of
household food to calculate the total calories and protein from the house-
hold food basket, and use these household-level measures of nutrition as
instruments for the heads’ nutritional intakes. Results from this first-stage
regression are shown in Table 5 in the Appendix. In the second stage we
use these first stage results to estimate each equation separately, and then
use estimated residuals from this stage to construct estimates of the covari-
ance matrix of residuals across equations; results from this second-stage
estimator are given in Table 6 in the Appendix. The third stage uses this
estimated covariance matrix to compute more efficient point estimates and
consistent estimates of the standard errors of the estimated coefficients.
Table 2 shows the results of the base nutrient instrumental variables re-
gressions (that is, the regressions for individual food expenditures, calories
intakes and protein intakes). Because key variables on both the right and left
hand sides of our estimating equation are expressed as changes in logs, the
4Since we’re taking differences of the logarithm of ages the age variable should be
thought of as changes in the proportionate ages of person i and the head.
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corresponding coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. For example,
we find a large difference in elasticities for males and females: for males in
the household, the results show that individual food expenditures increase
at a rate 50–60% more than the female household head (60% more for total
food expenditures, 49% more for calories, and 62% more for protein). In
sharp contrast, for other females in the household, the elasticities are not
much greater than one (increasing at a rate 1.5% greater for expenditures,
15.1% for calories, and 6.25% greater for protein).
To interpret these changes, consider that one measure of household shar-
ing is given by the coefficients associated with the household heads’ con-
sumption growth. If all household members had homogeneous risk atti-
tudes, then these coefficients would be equal to one under the null hypoth-
esis of perfect risk-sharing,5 Since in fact these coefficients are all much
greater than one for males, on a strict interpretation of (10) this implies that
males are considerably less averse to risk than are other household mem-
bers, and bear a disproportionate amount of the aggregate risk faced by
the household. Further, males’ tolerance of variation in the consumption
of calories is less than their tolerance of variation in either expenditures or
protein (relative to the household head), suggesting that when the house-
hold faces an adverse shock, males substitute toward less expensive sources
of calories to a greater extent than do females.
As with risk attitudes, (log) age has a very different influence on con-
sumption across sexes. On average a one percent increase in the ratio of
a male’s age to head’s age results in a 0.41 per cent increase in the value
of food consumed by that male, a corresponding 0.33 per cent increase in
calories and a 0.45 per cent increase in protein intake, increases that are
jointly highly significant. For females the point estimates suggest that age
increases consumption relative to the head, but none of the point estimates
are either individually or jointly significantly different from zero. Accord-
ingly, males not only bear the largest share of risk in the household, but also
assume additional risk as they age at much a greater rate than do females.
Interestingly, neither males nor females experience much of a reduction
in calories and protein when ill, despite one’s presumption that ill house-
hold members are apt to be less active. Sickness has no significant effect
on male’s consumption relative to the household head. Sickness causes
5And if these coefficients were equal, individual expenditure shares would be constant
(controlling for individual characteristics), and we could use a test of risk-sharing similar
to the test of Townsend (1994), with household expenditure aggregates on the right-hand-
side of the equation, instead of just the expenditures of the household head. But because
these coefficients are significantly (and dramatically) different across males and females,
this sort of aggregation in our case would be an evident mis-specification.
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females to have a (jointly) significant decrease in consumption, but of ap-
parently small magnitude. Surprisingly, being pregnant appears to result in
a larger fall in women’s food expenditures, calories, and protein than does
being sick but these effects, though large and individually significant, are
not jointly statistically significant.6
One of the important benefits of our structural model is that it gives us
easily interpretable parameter estimates. And within the class of structurally
estimated preferences we have an unusually rich parameterization, which
allows for a great deal of heterogeneity (often a weakness of structural ap-
proaches to estimation). Neverthless, if the preferences we give in (4) are
mis-specified, our results will be unreliable, even if there’s full risk-sharing
within these households.7
5.2. Testing Full Risk Sharing Within the Household. The estimates
presented in Table 2 shed light on the intra-household allocation of con-
sumption given the validity of our specification of preferences and given the
hypothesis that intra-household allocations are Pareto optimal, governed by
(2), that is that full risk sharing is achieved. In this case, the residuals from
(10) will be orthogonal to all other information, shocks, and other outcomes
which might affect the household or its individual members. In particular,
surprises in individual labor earnings ought not to have any effect on the
consumption allocation rule provided by (10).
To test this, we construct predictions of labor earnings for different indi-
viduals, and then to use these to construct measures of unpredicted earnings
shocks. Wages in this agricultural region have considerable seasonal varia-
tion, and vary also with weather shocks. Accordingly, we use two sorts of
information to predict wages. First are a variety of fixed (or slowly varying)
individual characteristics, such as sex, education, age, weight, and height
6WHO (1985) estimates that the energy needs of well-nourished women amount to 350
Calories more per day, or roughly a 15 per cent increase, when in the second and third
trimesters of pregnancy, though there’s evidence that at least part of this energy cost is
made up via reduced activity. Most strikingly, pregnancy seems to lead to a 16.9 per cent
reduction in woman’s share of household protein relative to the head, while WHO guide-
lines suggest that such women ought to receive an increase of roughly similar magnitude.
Reductions in activity will presumably have no direct effect on a pregnant woman’s need
for protein.
7We’ve tested our specification of utility by projecting the residuals on different func-
tions of variables which are assumed to be exogeneous. These tests provide evidence that
ζit ought to include squared terms for male age and male sickness. However, adding these
higher order terms complicates the interpretations of age and sickness without appreciably
changing any of our other estimated parameters, so we’ve consigned estimates of the more
complicated specification to Table 7 in the Appendix.
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(and squares of these last three quantities); next are month and village spe-
cific observations and predictions of weather (because of seasons, a large
component of weather changes is indeed easy to forecast).
Our construction of these weather predictions is worthy of some note.
From a single weather station in Malay-Balay, Bukidnon, we have monthly
information about the weather in this region over the period 1961 to 1994.
These data include information on maximum rainfall, humidity, the num-
ber of rainy days per month and a measure of cloudiness. We assume that
the weather at time t + 1 is unknown at time t, but that the weather his-
tory is known, and can be used to predict future weather outcomes. We
use these relatively long time series on weather variables to estimate a pre-
diction rule for these variables (after some experimentation, we settled on
regressing each of these variables on lags of six, twelve, and twenty-four
months). We then interact these weather variables with a complete set of
village dummy variables in a log-earnings regression. By themselves, these
predicted weather variables explain eleven per cent of observed variation in
log earnings.
When we use only predicted weather interacted with village dummies,
predicted earnings can only vary across time and villages. The variation
we’d like to have is in earnings across individuals within a household. Ac-
cordingly, we also interact predicted weather with individual characteris-
tics. These interactions are important: when we add them, the proportion
of variance in log earnings that we can explain doubles, giving us an R2
of 22 per cent. Education, age, and sex all are important for determining
earnings; physical characteristics less so (none is individually significant in
the predicted earnings regression).
We use the predicted earnings regression to construct predicted earnings
ypit+1 and ‘unpredicted’ earnings y
u
it+1, computed as the forecast error in
the predicted earnings regression. Both predicted and unpredicted earnings
variables vary across both time and people. We then add the change in
the earnings variables for both person i and the household head to the base
regression (10). Results are reported in the right-hand panel of Table 2.
By introducing overidentifying individual earnings variables in these equa-
tions, one can test for perfect risk sharing within the household. The re-
sults show clearly a rejection of full risk sharing since unpredicted earnings
shocks for the head, and both predicted and unpredicted individual earnings
shocks have a (jointly) significant effect on consumption.
Our results amount to a firm rejection of the null hypothesis that changes
in earnings are orthogonal to changes in consumption. However, the pattern
of results suggests another puzzle, as the patterns of signs associated with
the earnings variables vary in surprising ways. In particular, a one peso
increase in person i’s unpredicted earnings leads to an estimated 4 percent
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increase in i’s food expenditures relative to the head,8 but if anything ap-
pears to have a negative effect on nutrition. Related, the effect of surprises
in the heads’ earnings, though jointly significantly different from zero also
have disparate signs, with apparent decreases in expenditures and calories,
and an apparent increase in protein.
Predictable increases in earnings lead to a quite large and significant de-
crease in one’s expenditures, as well as large (but not individually signifi-
cant) decreases in calories and protein. In particular, we estimate that a one
peso increase in predicted earnings leads to a 78 percent decrease in food
expenditures, a 64 percent decrease in calories, and a 21 percent decrease
in the share of protein, all relative to the head’s consumption expenditures,
calories, and protein respectively.
We are surprised by the result that consumption responds differently to
predictable and unpredictable earnings shocks, not only because it leads us
to reject our null hypothesis of full risk-sharing, but because it seems to
rule out many plausible alternative models as well. Conditional at least on
utility being separable between consumption and activities, many alterna-
tive models would predict a positive correlation between individual earnings
and consumption (e.g., the household bargaining models of McElroy or the
collective models of Chiappori).
One possibility is, of course, that utility isn’t separable between con-
sumption and activities. For example, if leisure and consumption were com-
plements, then household members who worked harder (and earned more)
might also consume less. But while predictable increases in earnings have
a large, negative effect on own consumption, unpredictable increases have
a positive effect. Simply assuming a complementarity between leisure and
consumption can’t explain why the effects of predictable and unpredictable
earnings shocks should be different.
Beyond the specific possibility that leisure and consumption may not
be separable in utility, our test of full risk-sharing also relies more gener-
ally on the assumption that variation in earnings is unrelated to differences
across household members in changes in unobserved characteristics that
effect consumption allocations. Here it may be worth comparing our esti-
mation strategy to the approach one might take in a more ‘reduced-form’
exercise. “Double differencing” is a common strategy for dealing with un-
observed variation; in this setting the hope would be that by differencing
over time one could eliminate unobservable individual-specific fixed effects
8Average daily food expenditures per individual are about 6 pesos, so a one peso in-
crease in earnings is consequential.
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which might influence consumption, while by differencing across individ-
uals within the household that one could eliminate any time-varying unob-
servable factors which operate at the level of the household. But in effect
this what we do. Our estimating equation differences over time explicitly,
and across individuals within a household implicitly (by making everything
relative to the household head).
The real difference between our approach and something less structural is
the guidance our model gives us in specifying the functional form of the es-
timating equation (so that it’s in logarithms rather than levels, for example),
and that coefficients from our estimation are interpretable as being param-
eters of a system of demands. The theory also tells us something about
ways in which a possible mis-specification of preferences won’t affect our
test. For example, differences in discount factors either across or within
households won’t have any effect on our test; neither would unobserved
differences in demand shifters for different goods over individuals or time
(such differences would appear in the Aki or B
k
t terms in (4)).
5.3. Testing the Nutritional Investment Model. We’ve argued that the
fact that predictable and unpredictable shocks have different effects on intra-
household allocation is difficult to explain using a model like that offered in
Section 3, even if one allows for the possibility that we’ve mis-specicified
preferences.
However, we’ve also offered an alternative model, which has the property
that the household may make investments in the nutrition of members when
the predicted marginal return to those investments is high.
In particular, as discussed in Section 3, we use the consumption expendi-
tures by food categories to implement the same tests.9, and see how shocks
to earnings affect different of these food categories. The key to this test is to
note that if nutritional investment is driving changes in consumption, then
predicted or realized changes in returns to nutritional investment ought to
affect nutritional intakes; e.g., a family member who is expected to spend
long hours behind a plow might plausibly receive extra protein in advance
of plowing, and extra calories during the same period as the plowing occurs
(we do not observe returns to nutritional investment directly, but these will
affect individual earnings, which we do observe). However, if different sorts
of food both have the same nutritional value, but consumption of one sort
gives higher levels of utility (and hence is presumably more costly), then
our model of nutritional investment would predict increases in calories and
9Because consumption of some food items is sometimes zero, we replace the logarith-
mic transformation of food expenditures by the inverse hyperbolic sine (Robb et al., 1992;
Browning et al., 1994).
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protein in response to increases in earnings, but not necessarily in costlier
categories of food which are superior in terms of utility.
Following this logic, we reorganize food expenditures into groups ac-
cording to type, rather than nutrients. These groups include rice, corn, other
staples, meat and fish, vegetables, snacks and fruit, and a residual “other”
category. Basic results from our specification for the model without nutri-
tional investment appear in the left-hand panel of Table 3.
Because all our dependent variables in this specification are expenditures,
the estimated coefficients associated with the change in the logarithm of the
head’s expenditures can be interpreted as the elasticity of expenditures with
respect to the head’s expenditures. Then the expenditure elasticity of in-
dividual demand for these food groups shows the same division by gender
that we observed for total expenditures and nutrition. The expenditure elas-
ticities for males with respect to the head’s expenditures range from 1.20
for vegetables to 1.50 for meat (all are significantly greater than one), while
expenditure elasticities for other females in the household range from 0.65
for vegetables to 0.92 for “other staples” (all are significantly less than one).
However, unlike total expenditures, expenditures for most food groups do
not increase sharply with age for males. Only for vegetables do we see large
and statistically significant increases in expenditure, a result consistent with
a mounting body of evidence that children don’t like to eat their vegetables
(Blanchette and Brug, 2005).
Sickness had no significant effect on total expenditure or nutrition for
males, but perhaps these were masked by compositional changes in diet
as we do see significant effects across different food groups for males. In
particular, there’s some evidence of substitution away from corn (the main
staple), “other staples”, and vegetables toward rice, meat, and snacks, a
finding which may suggest some “coddling” of sick males. In contrast,
though sickness leads females to consume a smaller share of protein, it has
no significant effect on expenditures for any given food group. Neither do
pregnancy or nursing lead to significant changes in any food expenditure
group.
In Table 4 we add earnings changes to the base specification (as with
Table 2), and find additional evidence against within-household full risk
sharing. Increases in the head’s predicted earnings or a decrease in i’s pre-
dicted earnings both lead to a decrease in person i’s expenditures on rice
(the preferred staple) relative to the head, but an increase in i’s share of other
less desirable staples and “Other”. Thus changes in one person’s expected
earnings lead to rather large compositional changes in diet, even when the
overall effects on nutrition are more modest.
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The magnitude of the estimated effects of unpredicted changes to earn-
ings are generally much smaller than are the effects associated with pre-
dicted changes, but are also often statistically significant. Unpredicted changes
to head’s earnings result in significant decreases in i’s expenditures on “Other
Staples” or “Other”, while unpredicted changes to i’s own earnings lead to
a significant shift in expenditure away from corn and toward rice.
Overall, one can see that changes in earnings lead to changes in the
composition of diet, perhaps particularly between less-desirable (corn and
“other staples”) and more-desirable (rice and meat). These changes pose
a challenge to the hypothesis of full risk sharing, even when one allows
for the possibility of nutritional investments. Though our formulation of
preferences allows demand for different sorts of food to vary with various
time-varying observables, risk sharing within the household should rule out
variation in diet (either in quantities or composition) in response to earnings
shocks.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we’ve constructed a direct test of the hypothesis of full risk
sharing in food consumption within the household in the Bukidnon region
of the Philippines. Our test allows for a flexible specification of preferences,
with variation in risk aversion across individuals and which also allows us
to control for other observable individual characteristics. We reject the full
risk sharing hypothesis, as the allocation of food expenditures, calories, and
protein seems to depend on the realization of individuals’ off-farm earnings.
In contrast to other tests of risk sharing, we also investigate the possibil-
ity that dynamic effects related to the productivity of nutritional investments
in individuals may affect the allocation of food within the household. Ac-
cordingly, we consider a model in which food consumption produces not
only utils, but also functions as a form of nutritional investment, which may
be used to directly influence workers’ productivity. Then predictable vari-
ation in returns to nutrional investment could account for variation in the
intra-household allocation of food.
We find that indeed perfectly predictable variation in individual earn-
ings turns out to significantly affect expenditures and nutrition, consistent
with the hypothesis of nutritional investment. But at the same time, unpre-
dictable shocks to individual earnings tend to lead to increases in total food
expenditure, but decreases in calories and protein intakes. Earnings shocks
also lead to changes in the composition of diet, in what we interpret as shifts
between more and less desirable types of food. We’re left with strong ev-
idence against the hypothesis of full intra-household risk-sharing, whether
or not there’s nutritional investment.
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